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BLACK AND WHITE AND READ ALL OVER:
PRESS PROTECTION AFTER BRANZBURG
SEAN W. KELLY†
ABSTRACT
In 1972, the Supreme Court handed the press an apparent
resounding defeat in Branzburg v. Hayes, declaring that the
Constitution provided reporters no privilege from testifying about
their confidential sources. This Note uses previously unpublished
materials from the Justices’ personal files to illustrate the behind-thescenes deliberations as the Court shifted in ideology from the propress posture established by Justice Hugo Black in the Pentagon
Papers case to the anti-privilege position established by Justice Byron
White one year later in Branzburg. It also examines the curious
concurring opinion of Justice Lewis Powell in Branzburg and
subsequent efforts to craft a qualified reporter’s privilege, arguing
against further weakening press protection.

INTRODUCTION
At a White House press corps dinner in 2005, two San Francisco
Chronicle reporters stood with President George W. Bush to accept
the Edgar A. Poe Award for excellence in news coverage of national
significance.1 Their investigation into the BALCO steroids scandal
rocked baseball and other sports and “shook America’s sports world
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1. BALCO Reporters Win National Recognition; 2 Will Receive Prize at Washington
Dinner, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 10, 2005, at A2. BALCO stands for Bay Area Laboratory CoOperative.
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2
to its core.” Congressional hearings opened, Major League Baseball
instituted a new steroid-testing policy, and the stories galvanized
public sentiment to eliminate cheating in sport.3 “You’ve done a
service,” the president, a former owner of baseball’s Texas Rangers,
told Mark Fainaru-Wada, heartily shaking hands with the reporter
and his co-writer, Lance Williams.4
Thirteen months later, the United States Attorney’s Office
served the reporters with subpoenas demanding that they testify
before a grand jury investigating leaks in the BALCO case and give
up their confidential sources.5 “[Y]ou’re a little bit shocked when you
turn around and get a subpoena from [the] attorney general basically
telling you to drop everything you believe in and give up information
you promised you wouldn’t,” Fainaru-Wada later explained.6 Defying
the subpoena, the Chronicle reporters refused to testify and were
7
sentenced to eighteen months in prison for their “service.” Ironically,
their sentences were longer than those of any of the principal suspects
targeted in the original steroid probe by the FBI.8 Unbowed, FainaruWada and Williams refused to testify before the grand jury—one that
9
itself was investigating leaks from another grand jury. Upon his

2. Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, Address at the Meeting of the Commonwealth
Club of California (July 7, 2006), available at http://abclocal.go.com/kgo/story?section=
news&id=4625987. The reporters coauthored a book on the BALCO scandal. MARK FAINARUWADA & LANCE WILLIAMS, GAME OF SHADOWS: BARRY BONDS, BALCO, AND THE
STEROIDS SCANDAL THAT ROCKED PROFESSIONAL SPORTS (2006).
3. Mark Fainaru-Wada & Lance Williams, Steroids Scandal: The BALCO Legacy: From
Children to Pros, the Heat Is on to Stop Use of Performance Enhancers, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 24,
2006, at A1. On August 7, 2007, San Francisco Giants slugger Barry Bonds hit his 756th career
home run to become Major League Baseball’s all-time leader, surpassing the record of Hank
Aaron. George Vecsey, Bonds Leaves Lasting Mark with No. 756, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2007, at
A1 (“He will never outdistance all the footnotes and asterisks and doubts and suspicions in our
minds, but Barry Bonds hit those homers, all 756 of them. It’s his record.”).
4. Rick Reilly, It’s Clear Who’s Getting Creamed, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 30, 2006, at
78; see also Christine Brennan, Feds and Steroids: Mixed Signals, USA TODAY, Sept. 21, 2006, at
2C (reporting that President Bush said, “You’ve done a service”); Susan Sward, Prize-Winning
Journalist Was Always Drawn to Investigative Reporting, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2006, at A14
(same).
5. Adam Liptak, U.S. Subpoenas Newspaper for Sources in Steroid Case, N.Y. TIMES, May
9, 2006, at A23.
6. Interview by Bob Costas with Mark Fainaru-Wada, on Costas on the Radio (Premiere
Radio Networks radio broadcast Oct. 9, 2006), available at http://www.premiereradio.com/news/
view/197.html.
7. Joe Mozingo, Expose a Scandal, Face a Prison Term, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2006, at A1.
8. Lawrence Donegan, Reporters Who Broke BALCO Story Fight Prison Sentence, THE
GUARDIAN (London), Jan. 11, 2007, (Sports Pages), at 6.
9. Liptak, supra note 5.
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sentencing, Fainaru-Wada told the court, “I do not wish to spend
even a minute in jail. However, I cannot—and will not—betray the
promises I have made over the past three years” to confidential
10
sources. After the reporters were sentenced, twenty-four states,
news organizations, academics, attorneys, and others filed briefs on
their behalf.11 The court stayed their imprisonment, pending appeal.12
One week before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals planned to hear
their argument, prosecutors dropped charges against the reporters
when a defense lawyer admitted he leaked the information.13
Fainaru-Wada and Williams were excoriated by a few fellow
journalists who questioned their relationship with a source who
exploited the leaks.14 Yet much of the material that made the BALCO
case relevant to sports fans like President Bush would not have been
made public but for their reports. As Professor Alexander Bickel
famously wrote, “[T]he presumptive duty of the press is to publish,
not to guard security or to be concerned with the morals of its
sources. . . . [T]he press is a morally neutral, even an unconcerned,
agent as regards the provenance of newsworthy material that comes
to hand.”15 In court filings, federal prosecutors tried to convince a
judge to force the Chronicle reporters to testify by noting they
“may . . . have a profit motive” in the publication of their book, and
their articles had little value.16 Allowing prosecutors to determine

10. Bob Egelko, Silence Means Prison, Judge Tells Reporters, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 2006,
at A1.
11. Sabin Russell, States, News Groups Back Chronicle’s BALCO Reporters, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 12, 2006, at A17.
12. T.J. Quinn et al., Reporters Still Facing Jail, DAILY NEWS (New York, NY), Dec. 23,
2006, at 65.
13. Jesse McKinley, Reporters Avoid Jail in BALCO Case, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2007, at
D2.
14. See, e.g., Tim Rutten, Regarding Media: Protect Public Interest, Not Journalists’ SelfInterest, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, at E1 (“To assert any form of journalistic privilege in a
situation like that is something far worse than moral obtuseness. Conspiring with somebody you
know is actively perverting the administration of justice to your mutual advantage is a betrayal
of the public interest . . . .”).
15. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 81 (1975).
16. Bob Egelko, Feds Urge Judge: Force Reporters to Testify, S.F. CHRON., June 22, 2006, at
A1 (citing a filing by federal prosecutors in response to a motion by the Chronicle to quash the
subpoena). In the government’s motion, assistant U.S. attorneys revealed contempt for the
articles in question and degraded the reporters’ professional judgment. “In contrast, the ‘leaked
information’ served only to titillate and hold up to public ridicule those athletes who admitted
using steroids before the grand jury.” Id.
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journalistic ethics through selective subpoenas, however, is akin to
allowing reporters to draft the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Since the Supreme Court took up the issue of a reporter’s
privilege not to testify as to the identity of sources in 1972 in
17
Branzburg v. Hayes, the legal and reportorial landscape has shifted
18
significantly. The press has, to a greater or lesser degree, enjoyed a
privileged status among professions since the nation’s founding
through its inclusion in the First Amendment. Thomas Jefferson
famously wrote in 1787 that “were it left to me to decide whether we
should have a government without newspapers, or newspapers
without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the
latter.”19 In the First Congress, James Madison likewise said, “[T]he
freedom of the press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be
inviolable.”20 Justice Potter Stewart, who authored a stern dissent in
21
Branzburg, noted that the press is “the only organized private
business that is given explicit constitutional protection.”22 Yet even
noted First Amendment lawyer and press champion Floyd Abrams
declares that “[f]rom a distance of two centuries, the intentions of
those who drafted the First Amendment are not at all obvious.”23 If
they were, presumably there would be more clarity on when and why
reporters, like Fainaru-Wada and Williams, face jail time for refusing
to betray hard-won confidences. Through appeals to historical and
structural press protections, attorneys for the press were initially able
to make lemonade out of the sour decision laid at their feet by the

17. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
18. For a detailed legal analysis of the Branzburg opinion and its aftereffects, see generally
Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A First Amendment Standard for Safeguarding
Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143 (2000); Geoffrey R. Stone, Why We Need a
Federal Reporter’s Privilege, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 39 (2005); and Jeffrey S. Nestler, Comment,
The Underprivileged Profession: The Case for Supreme Court Recognition of the Journalist’s
Privilege, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 201 (2005).
19. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington (Jan. 16, 1787), in 11 THE PAPERS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 49 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1955).
20. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
21. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court’s opinion
“invites . . . authorities to undermine the historic independence of the press by attempting to
annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of government”).
22. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975).
23. FLOYD ABRAMS, SPEAKING FREELY: TRIALS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT xii (2005).
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Supreme Court in Branzburg. Increasingly, however, they are unable
24
to fend off multiplying subpoenas for reporters’ notes.
This Note uses previously unpublished materials from the files of
Supreme Court Justices to lay bare the disintegration of press
protection as the Court has shifted in ideology and argues against
further erosion of a qualified reporter’s privilege after Branzburg.
Although the ambiguous Branzburg opinion denies an absolute
constitutional right for reporters to refuse to reveal sources, this Note
finds that a careful reading of the opinion—keeping in mind the
Justices’ reasoning—mandates both judicial and prosecutorial
discretion when compelling journalists to testify. Part I features an indepth look at the decisions behind the Branzburg decision, including
notes from various Justices’ files. It also includes an examination of a
previously unpublished concurring opinion by Chief Justice Warren
Burger in Branzburg. Part II examines the transition in Supreme
Court jurisprudence from Justice Hugo Black, who wrote for the
majority in favor of the press in the Pentagon Papers case,25 to Justice
Byron White, who wrote for the majority against the press one year
later in Branzburg. Part III examines the lack of proper prosecutorial
and judicial discretion shown in cases involving reporters compelled
to testify before grand juries. A careful reading of the Branzburg
decision shows that prosecutors must use considerable discretion
when subpoenaing reporters. Although the Supreme Court became
less protective of the press in the early 1970s, it nevertheless in
Branzburg relied upon prosecutorial and judicial discretion as the
fail-safe in protecting the press and the public’s right to know. Judges
and prosecutors, however, have ignored that fail-safe, basing their
actions on an ultimately misguided interpretation of Branzburg.
I. BRANZBURG 360˚
Exactly 365 days after the Pentagon Papers decision,26 the Court
27
issued its opinion in Branzburg v. Hayes. The decision combined

24. See David Carr, The Media Equation: Subpoenas and the Press, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,
2006, at C1 (quoting Hearst Corporation general counsel Eve Burton as saying, on the increase
in subpoenas, “[i]f the government wins [the BALCO] case, every reporter’s notebook will be
available to the government for the asking”).
25. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
26. New York Times Co. v. United States was decided on June 30, 1971.
27. The decision in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), was issued June 29, 1972. The
year 1972 was a leap year.
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three cases involving claims of privilege by reporters, including
28
29
Caldwell v. United States and In re Pappas.
The Justices split sharply on whether reporters have a
constitutional privilege to refuse to testify before a grand jury.
Writing for a 5–4 majority, Justice Byron White held that no
30
constitutional privilege exists, either absolute or qualified. Justice
Lewis Powell, although joining the majority, wrote a concurring
opinion that sought to split the atom by proposing a case-by-case
31
balancing test. The dissenting Justices tersely found that reporters
do have a constitutional privilege to refuse to identify confidential
sources.32 Mindful of the blistering dissent, which referenced the
33
“Court’s crabbed view of the First Amendment,” the majority
hinged its analysis on the discretion of judges and prosecutors and
noted that “news gathering is not without its First Amendment
protections, and grand jury investigations if instituted or conducted
other than in good faith, would pose wholly different issues for
resolution under the First Amendment.”34
Trailing only Roe v. Wade,35 some scholars have pronounced
Branzburg the Burger Court’s second-most controversial decision.36

28. Caldwell v. United States, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970).
29. In re Pappas, 266 N.E.2d 297 (Mass. 1971).
30. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667 (“The issue in these cases is whether requiring newsmen to
appear and testify before state or federal grand juries abridges the freedom of speech and press
guaranteed by the First Amendment. We hold that it does not.”); see also Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991) (“[T]he First Amendment [does not] relieve a newspaper
reporter of the obligation shared by all citizens to respond to a grand jury subpoena and answer
questions relevant to a criminal investigation, even though the reporter might be required to
reveal a confidential source.”).
31. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 712 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“It is my view that there is no ‘compelling need’
that can be shown which qualifies the reporter’s immunity from appearing or testifying before a
grand jury, unless the reporter himself is implicated in a crime.”); id. at 725 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting) (noting a reporter’s “constitutional right to a confidential relationship with his
source”).
33. Id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 708 (majority opinion) (“Grand juries are subject to judicial control and
subpoenas to motions to quash. We do not expect courts will forget that grand juries must
operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth.”).
35. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
36. See Alpheus Thomas Mason, Whence and Whither the Burger Court? Judicial SelfRestraint: A Beguiling Myth, 41 REV. POL. 3, 21 (1979) (“Except for its ruling outlawing state
abortion laws, no decision of the Burger Court has aroused deeper concern among citizens and
dissenting justices than Branzburg v. Hayes.”).
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37
The “ambiguously” decided case was the product of deep divisions
and heated debate within the Court, as illustrated by the Justices’
private papers.

A. The Press
In the late 1960s, Louisville Journal-Courier reporter Paul
Branzburg uncovered local hashish manufacturing and a burgeoning
drug trade.38 When subpoenaed to testify about his sources before
grand juries, Branzburg refused for fear of disclosing his hard-won
39
confidences. Branzburg was no ordinary reporter at a regional daily
newspaper. He was a Harvard Law School graduate who would go on
40
to be a top journalist at the Detroit Free Press.
The Court joined Paul Branzburg’s case with those of Earl
Caldwell, a New York Times reporter who covered the Black Panther
Party and other militant groups and refused to give up notes and tape
recordings of interviews, and Paul Pappas, a television reporter who
refused to testify before a grand jury about what he had learned
41
inside a Black Panthers headquarters.
After the Supreme Court’s ruling, Paul Branzburg was sentenced
to six months in prison, but the Michigan governor refused to
extradite the reporter back to Kentucky, and he never served a day in
42
jail. “When the legal drama finally ended, I still had not revealed my
sources,” Branzburg said in 1992.43 “I knew all along it would end that
way.”44
B. The Majority
In conference after oral argument, it quickly became apparent
that the reporters would receive little sympathy from the Court. Chief
Justice Warren Burger and Justices White, Harry Blackmun, and
William Rehnquist were disinclined to grant any privilege, let alone

37.
38.

ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 69.
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667; FRANCIS WILKINSON, ESSAYS IN ESSENTIAL LIBERTY:
FIRST AMENDMENT BATTLES FOR A FREE PRESS 91 (1992).
39. WILKINSON, supra note 38, at 91–93.
40. Id.
41. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 672–73, 675–76.
42. WILKINSON, supra note 38, at 93.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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45
one with a constitutional dimension. Justice Powell would join them,
46
to an uncertain degree. White addressed the conference, saying,
“Presently, I don’t think I’d establish any privilege at all . . . . I would
not in any event allow a privilege to the extent of keeping confidential
what [he] has seen [of an] actual crime.”47 Chief Justice Burger,
according to Douglas’s conference notes, said it was a matter of
48
common law, not constitutional law. “He was witness to [a] criminal
act,” Burger said, according to Douglas.49 “No constitutional
protection.”50
Blackmun’s private notes reveal his inner thoughts on the case.
Among the things he listed under “Am impressed by,” Blackmun
included “For 200 years we have got along all right,” “We are
concerned here with crime,” “Can assert his defenses just as everyone
else can,” and “We should be able to handle this short of a
constitutional privilege—yet Kentucky’s treatment bothers me.”51
“Why has this never been raised before in over 200 years?”
52
Blackmun wrote. “What this case seems to amount to, for me, is an
all out attack on the grand jury system.”53 Blackmun wrote that he
“hesitate[s] to impinge on the grand jury function or to expand First
54
Amendment rights in this context.”
Rehnquist, new to the Court like Powell, took an originalist
position. “Framers no contemplate,” Rehnquist stated, according to

45. See Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun in Branzburg v. Hayes (Feb. 25,
1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of
Congress, Box 138) [hereinafter Blackmun, Conference Notes in Branzburg]; Conference Notes
of Justice William O. Douglas in Branzburg v. Hayes (Feb. 25, 1972) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box 1547) [hereinafter
Douglas, Conference Notes in Branzburg]; Conference Notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in
Branzburg v. Hayes (Feb. 25, 1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Lewis F. Powell,
Jr., Papers, Powell Archives, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 147)
[hereinafter Powell, Conference Notes in Branzburg].
46. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709–10 (Powell, J., concurring).
47. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM: THE BURGER COURT IN
ACTION 165 (1990).
48. Douglas, Conference Notes in Branzburg, supra note 45.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Branzburg, supra note 45, Box 139. Blackmun often
used shorthand, but his words are spelled out in this Note. Indecipherable words and phrases
have been omitted.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
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55

Blackmun’s shorthand. But Rehnquist ultimately may have been in a
compromised position on the case, having served as the Justice
Department’s primary spokesman for its policy of subpoenaing
reporters during investigations into the Black Panthers and other
militant groups while he was assistant attorney general.56 Rehnquist
refused to recuse himself from the case and “showed no
57
consciousness of impropriety.”
Interestingly and perhaps as a result of Burger’s appeal to
common law, the Justices consulted a 1963 British case on the subject,
58
and several included it in their related case files. In Attorney-General
59
v. Mulholland, the Queen’s Bench stated:
Take the clergyman, the banker or the medical man. None of these
is entitled to refuse to answer when directed by a judge . . . . The
judge will respect the confidences which each member of these
honourable professions receives in the course of it, and will not
direct him to answer unless not only it is relevant but also it is a
proper and, indeed, necessary question in the course of justice to be
60
put and answered.

Thus, the common law, according to their lordships in deciding
Mulholland, accords journalists consideration similar to clergy,
doctors, or those in fiduciary positions. The inclusion of the term
“necessary question” in the Mulholland case indicates that under the
law of England, questions put to reporters to reveal sources must be
necessary to justice. It indicates an evidentiary privilege could be
accorded reporters, and its inclusion in the Justices’ case files may
help explain the similar position taken by Justice Lewis Powell in his
notable concurrence.

55. Id.
56. JOHN P. MACKENZIE, THE APPEARANCE OF JUSTICE 240 (1974).
57. Id. at 241.
58. See Justice William J. Brennan’s Copy of the Queen’s Bench Opinion in AttorneyGeneral v. Mulholland, in the Branzburg v. Hayes Case File (undated) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers, Library of Congress, Box I:261); Justice
Thurgood Marshall’s Copy of the Queen’s Bench Opinion in Attorney-General v. Mulholland, in
the Branzburg v. Hayes Case File (undated) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, Box 83). Brennan’s celebrated year-end case
histories, alas, do not include a review of Branzburg. See Jim Newton, The Brennan Memos,
SLATE, Jan. 9–11, 2007, http://www.slate.com/id/2156940 (excerpting Brennan’s “extraordinary
annual memoranda documenting the court’s work”).
59. Att’y-Gen. v. Mulholland, (1963) 2 Q.B. 477.
60. Id. at 489–90 (finding no common-law reporter’s privilege).
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C. The Wild Card
Few Supreme Court opinions have caused more head scratching,
even among contemporaneous brethren, than Justice Lewis Powell’s
three-quarter page concurrence in Branzburg.61 Although he joined
the majority in rejecting a constitutional privilege, Powell did so only
assuming a base level of judicial and prosecutorial discretion. He
suggested a balancing test for an evidentiary privilege:
The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to
criminal conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and
societal interests on a case-by-case basis accords with the tried and
62
traditional way of adjudicating such questions.

From the moment it appeared, Powell’s opinion has been treated
as everything from the controlling opinion to a side note akin to
63
64
dictum. The “singularly opaque,” “oddball” opinion led some to
consider the Court “really split 4-1-4, with Justice Powell’s lone
concurrence bearing the greatest weight of the Court’s authority.”65
Combined with Powell’s later concurrence in Zurcher v. Stanford
66
Daily, the opinion “left the constitutional waters of press privilege
somewhat murky.”67
Powell’s comments in conference clarify the reasoning behind his
opinion. He said, “It would be unwise to give the press any
constitutional privilege and we’re writing on a clean slate, so we don’t
have to give constitutional status to newsmen. I’d leave it to the
legislatures to create one.”68 Although he voted with the majority in
Branzburg, he wrote, “I don’t agree with much of Ky. opinion but if
61. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709–10 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); see Sonja R.
West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the Confusion, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 1953–54
(2006) (discussing the confusion surrounding the authority of Justice Powell’s Branzburg
concurrence).
62. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
63. James C. Goodale, Branzburg v. Hayes and the Developing Qualified Privilege for
Newsmen, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 709, 709 (1975).
64. Stephen Bates, Getting to the Source: The Curious Evolution of Reporters’ Privilege,
SLATE, Dec. 26, 2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2093187 (last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
65. WILKINSON, supra note 38, at 104.
66. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 576 (1978) (upholding a search warrant for the
files of a student newspaper in an attempt to get photographs of alleged illegal activity).
67. LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 19 (1991).
68. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 165.
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69
there is no 1 Amend. Privilege, this is merely a state case.”
Likewise, he voted to affirm in Pappas, even though he wrote, “I
don’t like [the] opinion or result.”70 He continued, “[A]s I have
concluded there is no constitutional privilege, I have no choice but to
71
affirm.” Powell joined White’s majority opinion, but drafted his
concurrence to “emphasize what seems to me to be the limited nature
72
of the Court’s holding.”
Justice Stewart quickly redrafted his dissent to account for
73
Powell’s ambiguous concurrence. The second draft—the published
version of the dissent—called Powell’s separate opinion “enigmatic”74
and stated that “[t]he disclaimers in Mr. Justice Powell’s concurring
opinion leave room for the hope that in some future case the Court
may take a less absolute position in this area.”75
Powell’s private writings reveal his own less-than-absolute
position. His notes immediately after argument show that although he
did not believe there was an absolute constitutional privilege, he felt
that a court must engage in “balancing First Amendment interests
76
against the other interests involved.” Powell wrote in longhand on
his notes in Caldwell:

My vote turned on my conclusion—after hearing arguments of
counsel & re-reading principal briefs—that we should not establish a
constitutional privilege. If we did this, the problems that would flow
from it would be difficult to foresee: e.g. applying a privilege of

69. Powell, Conference Notes in Branzburg, supra note 45, Box 146, 70-85.
70. Conference Notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in In re Pappas (Feb. 25, 1972)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives,
Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 146).
71. Id.
72. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
73. Changes from the first draft of the dissent to the second draft reflect this hasty
adjustment. Compare First Draft, Dissent of Justice Potter Stewart in Branzburg v. Hayes (June
23, 1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of
Congress, Box 83), with Second Draft, Dissent of Justice Potter Stewart in Branzburg v. Hayes
(June 23, 1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of
Congress, Box 83) [hereinafter Stewart, Branzburg Dissent, Second Draft].
74. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting); see also Stewart, Branzburg
Dissent, Second Draft, supra note 73 (including Justice Stewart’s revised language from the first
draft of his dissent).
75. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 746 n.36.
76. Tentative Impressions of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in Branzburg v. Hayes (Feb. 23,
1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives,
Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 146).
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const. dimensions to grand jurys [sic], petite juries, congressional
77
committees, etc. . . . And who are “newsmen”—how to define?

But, Powell added, “I will make clear in an opinion . . . that there is a
privilege analogous to an evidentiary one, which courts should
recognize & apply in case by case to protect confidential
information.”78
Unfortunately, Powell’s private notes offer little further guidance
about the exact dimensions of the evidentiary privilege that should be
accorded reporters. Unlike his voluminous notes on later cases like
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,79 Powell’s archived
material on Branzburg fills just one thin folder.80 His Caldwell and
81
Pappas files hold little more.
It does seem clear that Powell never entirely agreed with the
majority opinion, despite joining it. Anthony Lewis, the New York
Times writer and legal scholar with whom Powell often corresponded,
wrote the Justice in 1975 to compliment his First Amendment
82
jurisprudence. “[Y]our opinions in this area are something special,”
Lewis wrote. “The dialogue with Justice White is especially
interesting, starting with Branzburg.”83 Mr. Lewis’s letter shows that
many of those close to Powell believed the Justice never fully joined
White’s absolute rejection of a reporter’s privilege.

77. Conference Notes of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in United States v. Caldwell (Feb. 25,
1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives,
Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 146) [hereinafter Powell, Conference Notes
in Caldwell].
78. Id.
79. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
80. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives, Washington & Lee University School of
Law, Box 146. Powell had been seated for just forty-eight days when Branzburg was argued on
Feb. 23, 1972. Powell and Rehnquist took the oath of office on Jan. 7, 1972. Paul C.
Bartholomew, The Supreme Court of the United States, 1971–1972, 25 W. POL. Q. 761, 761
(1972). Although his judicial philosophy may have differed from his predecessor’s, Powell took
two of Black’s clerks for the term in 1972. JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR.
242 (1994).
81. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Powell Archives, Washington & Lee University School of
Law, Box 146.
82. Letter from Anthony Lewis to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., (Mar. 31, 1975) (on file with
the Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Papers, Washington & Lee University School of Law, Box 120).
83. Id. The case name is underlined in the original letter.
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D. The Dissenters
Justice Potter Stewart authored the dissent in Branzburg, finding
a constitutional privilege for reporters and excoriating “[t]he Court’s
crabbed view of the First Amendment.”84 Justices William Brennan
and Thurgood Marshall joined the dissent. Justice William O.
Douglas filed a separate dissent also finding a constitutional privilege
but focusing on Earl Caldwell, the New York Times reporter.85
Justice Stewart had been a reporter both while in college at Yale
86
and at the Cincinnati Times-Star. Time magazine offered him a
position, but he went to law school instead.87 By dissenting in
Branzburg, Stewart was effectively reversing his circuit court position
88
in Garland v. Torre. But, as Justice Stewart said in conference,
“constitutional law develops in a hurry.”89 Stewart was “tentative,”90
but reportedly said, “[t]he First Amendment requires some kind of
91
qualified privilege for confidences to reporters.” In the dissent,
Stewart famously warned against “annex[ing] the journalistic
92
profession as an investigative arm of government.”
The other Justices who joined Stewart were less predisposed to
accepting the press’ arguments. “I no like reporters,” was Justice
William Brennan’s first statement at the conference, as summarized
93
94
in Blackmun’s shorthand. “But press is important to be free.”

84. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 724–25 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
86. Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Justice Potter Stewart: Decisional Patterns in Search of Doctrinal
Moorings, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL AND JUDICIAL PROFILES 375, 390 (Charles M.
Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991).
87. Id.
88. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549–50 (2d Cir. 1958) (finding no constitutional
privilege for a reporter to refuse to disclose the name of an informant in a defamation case
involving actress Judy Garland). Justice Powell’s conference notes state that Stewart said his
“views have evolved since Garland v. Torre.” Powell, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note
77.
89. Conference Notes of Justice Harry A. Blackmun in United States v. Caldwell (Feb. 25,
1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of
Congress, Box 138) [hereinafter Blackmun, Conference Notes in Caldwell].
90. Powell, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 77.
91. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 165.
92. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 89.
94. Id.
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Brennan supported the privilege for reporters, even though it “may
95
not be absolute (as Hugo [Black] thought).”
Justice Thurgood Marshall said he thought “the press
exaggerates the importance of [confidentiality],” but joined the
96
dissent anyway. At conference, he argued for a qualified privilege
and said the reporter had a choice: “Go to [the grand jury] first or . . .
97
move to quash at outset—with burden on newsman.” He “cannot
98
tell the grand jury to go to hell,” Marshall said.
In his separate dissent, Justice William O. Douglas stated that “a
newsman has an absolute right not to appear before a grand jury,”
but he confined his dissent to the Caldwell case.99 Douglas wrote at
least seven drafts of his dissent, focusing on “privacy of association”
as much as press freedom.100 Douglas’s conference notes offer little
insight into his reasoning. They are little more than one-liners from
each Justice and do not elaborate on his own thoughts at the time.101
Blackmun privately scoffed at Douglas’s dissenting analysis,
reading with a critical eye and making caustic comments in the
102
margins. When Douglas noted that reporter Caldwell is “black,”
103
Blackmun underlined the passage and wrote “So?” nearby. At the
end of Douglas’s circulated dissent, Blackmun wrote, “The strong last
[paragraphs] are weakened by the first nine!”104 When Douglas wrote
about the “amazing position that First Amendment rights are to be
balanced against other needs or conveniences of government,”
Blackmun underlined “amazing” and noted, “Only to WOD [William

95. Powell, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 77.
96. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 165.
97. Powell, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 77.
98. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 89.
99. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 711–12 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas
stated that his view of the First Amendment was close to that of Professor Alexander
Meiklejohn, who declared that it is “an absolute.” Id. at 713.
100. Id. at 715. Douglas’s papers include seven drafts of his dissent, with sections cut and
pasted throughout. The seventh draft is virtually identical to his published dissent. Compare
Seventh Draft, Dissent of Justice William O. Douglas in United States v. Caldwell (Apr. 1972)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the William O. Douglas Papers, Library of Congress, Box
1547), with Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 711–12 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
101. Douglas, Conference Notes in Branzburg, supra note 45.
102. Justice Harry A. Blackmun’s Copy of Fourth Draft, Dissent of Justice William O.
Douglas in United States v. Caldwell (May 30, 1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Library of Congress, Box 139).
103. Id.
104. Id.
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105
O. Douglas].” When Douglas wrote “that the fences of the law and
the tradition that has protected the press are broken down,”
Blackmun wrote, “They were never up to this point.”106

E. The Chief Justice Speaks . . . Softly
After the Branzburg dissenters circulated their first draft and
Powell wrote his concurrence, Chief Justice Burger—perhaps sensing
the deepening divisions on the Court—fired back with a curt, twopage concurring opinion that scolded the dissenters without
107
advancing much new argument. Indeed, his never-before-published
concurrence contains just one footnote.108
It is unclear exactly why Burger did not publish his opinion,
because his papers remain closed to the public.109 Yet his unpublished
concurrence offers a stinging rebuke to the dissenters, and perhaps
the Chief Justice did not wish to air the division so publicly. The
dissent “takes a great leap and assert[s], without any foundation in
history or other authority” that there is a reporter’s privilege, Burger
wrote.110 “Surely,” the Chief Justice wrote, “the matter is not quite so
simple.”111
At conference, Burger said that no one, “except the President of
the U.S.” could claim privilege from a grand jury subpoena.112 “He
113
must go.” His draft concurrence said:
An integral and what I consider mistaken step in the analysis of the
three dissenters is the assumption that there is some constitutional
right to gather news in a particular manner—in this case a
constitutional right to refuse a grand jury subpoena or to refuse to
114
give testimony before the grand jury.

105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Draft Concurrence of Chief Justice Warren E. Burger in Branzburg v. Hayes (June 26,
1972) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the William J. Brennan, Jr., Papers, Library of
Congress, Box I:263) [hereinafter Burger, Draft Concurrence in Branzburg].
108. Id.
109. Burger’s papers are closed to the public until the year 2026. The College of William and
Mary, Warren E. Burger Online Exhibit, http://swem.wm.edu/exhibits/burger/index.cfm (last
visited Sept. 27, 2007).
110. Burger, Draft Concurrence in Branzburg, supra note 107, at 1.
111. Id.
112. SCHWARTZ, supra note 47, at 165.
113. Blackmun, Conference Notes in Caldwell, supra note 89.
114. Burger, Draft Concurrence in Branzburg, supra note 107.
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Burger’s draft opinion stated, “If there were any genuine, or even
plausible, basis for the sweeping claim made here for reporters, one
might well ask how a free press has flourished in America as no
where else in the world for nearly 200 years, without the protection
115
now asserted to be indispensable.”
Burger then answered his own question in his attempt to marshal
the dissenters to his view. “The answer lies in part at least in the fact
that by and large, the confidentiality of sources has been respected
and governments have not sought needlessly to disturb the reporter116
informant relationship.” Here, the Chief Justice implies that a
privilege might be found when the government widely fails to respect
the importance of a reporter’s vow of confidentiality. In drafting his
criticism of the dissent, Burger assumed that prosecutors would use
considerable discretion in seeking subpoenas and that judges would
do likewise when upholding them.
II. FROM BLACK TO WHITE
In the October 1971 term, when Branzburg was decided, the
Supreme Court underwent a dramatic shift. Justices Hugo Black and
John Harlan left the Court in September 1971 and died shortly
thereafter.117 They were replaced by Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and William
Rehnquist, respectively.118 Black, who served on the high Court from
119
took an “absolutist” position on the First
1937 to 1971,
120
Amendment. Black thought that “we must overprotect speech in
order to protect speech that matters.”121 With his departure came a
more pragmatic Court, one less inclined to grant broad protections to

115. Id. at 2.
116. Id.
117. Anthony Lewis, Give Me Liberty: Individual Rights in a Time of War, 13 MEDIA L. &
POL’Y 6, 6 nn.1–2 (2004).
118. E.g., Alan B. Morrison, The Rehnquist Choice, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1457, 1457 (2003)
(reviewing JOHN W. DEAN, THE REHNQUIST CHOICE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NIXON
APPOINTMENT THAT REDEFINED THE SUPREME COURT (2001)).
119. JOHN P. FRANK, INSIDE JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK: THE LETTERS 1 (2000).
120. E.g., Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 978 (2003).
121. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and
Walker, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 294.
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the press even though “[p]ress law . . . is largely a creature of the
122
seventies.”
The shift in First Amendment jurisprudence was apparent in the
Branzburg decision. With the absolutist Black gone, the majority fell
in line with Justice Byron White, whose personal pique with the press
may have influenced his judicial philosophy on cases involving
123
journalists and media organizations. The fate of press protection
had shifted from Black to White, and lower courts have been
124
confused and contradictory ever since.
A. Justice Black
When the Court granted certiorari in Branzburg,125 attorneys for
the press figured they had four Justices on their side. “Justices Hugo
Black, William O. Douglas, William J. Brennan and Thurgood
Marshall all seemed to us to be likely votes,” press counsel Floyd
Abrams later wrote.126 Justice Potter Stewart, a former reporter
himself, would also come out solidly for the press, despite some of his
127
more conservative inclinations on most civil liberties. In June 1971,
Justice Black selected his clerks for the upcoming term, “indicating
128
that he intended to carry on” even though he had been “too old and
decrepit to marshal a Court” in the Pentagon Papers case the year
before.129
Born and raised in central Alabama, Hugo Black made a
“Horatio Alger rise to the top.”130 Black’s work as a boy in Alabama
at both conservative and Populist papers may have shaped his views

122. A.E. Dick Howard, The Burger Court and the First Amendment: A Framework, in THE
FIRST AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS 129, 135 (Bill F. Chamberlin & Charlene J. Brown eds., 1982).
123. See, e.g., DENNIS J. HUTCHINSON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE: A
PORTRAIT OF JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 383 (1998) (recounting an article calling White the
“Javert of the American press” and accusing him of “pursu[ing] our editors and publishers
with . . . cold fury”).
124. See infra Part III.
125. Justice Black was still on the Court when Branzburg was granted certiorari on May 3,
1971. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 402 U.S. 942, 942 (1971) (mem.).
126. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 3.
127. Yarbrough, supra note 86, at 390.
128. Mason, supra note 36, at 10.
129. FRANK, supra note 119, at 38.
130. Hugo L. Black, Jr., Foreword to INSIDE JUSTICE HUGO L. BLACK: THE LETTERS, supra
note 119, at vii, viii.
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131
on the press. Black and his brother worked a number of odd jobs
growing up, but “[t]he boys’ most rewarding job was as the ‘printer’s
devil’ at competing local newspapers. Because of their literacy, the
boys qualified to set type, letter by letter, creating the galleys of handdriven presses.”132 Not only did Black set type, he sometimes wrote
short news stories covering events in town or at the courthouse.
Perhaps because of his childhood experiences, Black’s judicial
philosophy belied his sometimes rocky relationship with the press.
Indeed, “Black owed his whole political, and therefore his judicial,
career to his ability to surmount a formidable opposition and a hostile
press . . . .”133 His son said, “The press certainly had no reason to
expect him to be their champion, considering the treatment he
134
received at their hands during his lifetime.” Black had never “quite
forgiven the press for the way he was treated” when his ties to the Ku
Klux Klan as a young man in Alabama were brought up after his
appointment to the Court, and he felt that “rich Republicans
controlled the press.”135 Still, Black’s “conviction grew with each
passing year that [the words of the First Amendment] mean more to
136
the preservation of our democratic republic than any others.” With
this conviction, he granted the press broad protection.
With respect to First Amendment guarantees, Black was famous
for his pronouncement, “No law means no law.”137 In the Pentagon
Papers case, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold (perhaps unwisely)
challenged Black on this point, stating

Now Mr. Justice . . . . You say that “no law” means “no law,” and
that should be obvious. I can only say . . . that to me it is equally
obvious that “no law” does not mean “no law,” and I would seek to
138
persuade the Court that this is true.

131. STEVE SUITTS, HUGO BLACK OF ALABAMA: HOW HIS ROOTS AND EARLY CAREER
SHAPED THE GREAT CHAMPION OF THE CONSTITUTION 84 (2005).
132. Id.
133. GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 270 (1977).
134. HUGO L. BLACK, JR., MY FATHER: A REMEMBRANCE 185 (1975).
135. ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY 614 (1997).
136. BLACK, JR., supra note 134, at 183–84.
137. HUGO LAFAYETTE BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 45 (1968).
138. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 40.
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139

Griswold’s “Alice in Wonderland” argument failed to persuade the
140
Court, and Black “listened to it with evident delight.”
Black’s broad First Amendment interpretation was apparent in
his other opinions as well. Black wrote a famous concurrence in New
141
York Times v. Sullivan, the “crown jewel of First Amendment
142
143
law.” And in his Bridges v. California opinion, Black stated,
“[T]he First Amendment does not speak equivocally . . . . It must be
taken as a command of the broadest scope that explicit language, read
144
in the context of a liberty-loving society, will allow.”
But reliance on Black may have been questionable for press
advocates in Branzburg. Had he lived, Black likely would have sided
with the press position. Yet Black drew a thick, bright line between
speech and conduct, absolutely protecting the former while offering
145
the latter little protection. In a series of lectures at Columbia
University in 1968, Black stated, “In giving absolute protection to free
speech, . . . I have always been careful to draw a line between speech
and conduct.”146 In Bridges v. California, Black weighed speech and
conduct carefully in the context of criminal trials. “[F]ree speech and
fair trials are two of the most cherished policies of our civilization,
and it would be a trying task to choose between them.”147 A wellpleaded argument by the government, focusing on the conduct of
reporters in refusing to appear before a legitimately convened grand
jury in a criminal probe, may have made the Alabama absolutist think
twice before rubber-stamping the reporters’ argument.
Despite this potential reservation, Black consistently took strong
positions in favor of press protections while on the bench. “The
Government’s power to censure the press was abolished so that the
press would remain forever free to censure the Government,” he
139. NEWMAN, supra note 135, at 616. See LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN
WONDERLAND AND THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS 185 (Random House 2002) (1865)
(“‘When I use a word,’ Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, ‘it means just what I
choose it to mean—neither more nor less.’”).
140. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 40.
141. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 293–97 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
142. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at xvi.
143. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
144. Id. at 263.
145. William C. Warren, Foreword to BLACK, supra note 137, at ix, x (1968) (“[Black]
carefully distinguishes conduct not protected by the First Amendment, such as picketing or
demonstrating, even though utilized to communicate ideas.”).
146. BLACK, supra note 137, at 53.
147. Bridges, 314 U.S. at 260.
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148

wrote in the Pentagon Papers case. “In my view, far from deserving
condemnation for their courageous reporting, the New York Times,
the Washington Post, and other newspapers should be commended
149
for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly.”
Some commentators believe that Branzburg and other press
defeats before the high Court “would not have survived the scrutiny
150
of former Justices Hugo Black and William O. Douglas [together].”
151
With Black gone, the tide for the press had turned.
B. Justice White
Justice Byron White, known even to his clerks as “terse and
152
gruff,” treated no one with more disdain than journalists. White was
“anathema to the press,” a Justice Department colleague recalled.153
Beginning during his time as an All-American on the University of
Colorado football team, White was hounded by reporters looking for
scoops on the most successful scholar-athlete ever to play college
154
football. Later, his retirement from the Court in 1993 was greeted
with a general sigh of relief from the Fourth Estate155 and even a
caustic good riddance from many corners.156 He viewed the press with

148. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
149. Id.
150. Floyd Abrams, The Burger Court and the First Amendment: An Analysis, in THE FIRST
AMENDMENT RECONSIDERED: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE MEANING OF FREEDOM OF
SPEECH AND PRESS, supra note 122, at 138, 142.
151. Black’s relationship with Justice White was not close. “With [Justice] White, there was
a real gulf of approach; there was respect, but no empathy.” FRANK, supra note 119, at 62.
There is little documentation of their working relationship because, unfortunately, many of
Black’s papers—some six hundred binders worth—were burned within months of his death. S.
Sidney Ulmer, Bricolage and Assorted Thoughts on Working in the Papers of Supreme Court
Justices, 35 J. POL. 286, 289 (1973). Although all his conference notes and sensitive files were
burned, some of Justice Black’s papers are preserved in the Manuscript Division of the Library
of Congress. Black was buried with several “10 cent copies of the Constitution in his suit
pocket.” BLACK, JR., supra note 134, at 266.
152. Biographical Study Unveils Some of Justice Byron White’s Mystery, U. CHI. CHRON.
Oct. 29, 1998, http://chronicle.uchicago.edu/981029/hutchinson.shtml (quoting former clerk and
biographer Dennis Hutchinson).
153. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 123, at 449 (quoting Edwin O. Guthman, Press Sec’y,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
154. Id. at 43 (calling it “Whizzermania”).
155. The “Fourth Estate” is common shorthand for the press. E.g., Howard Kurtz, Survey
Finds Angst-Strained Wretches in the Fourth Estate, WASH. POST, May 24, 2004, at C1.
156. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 123, at 382–84 (noting that White was derided as “both a
knave and a fool”).
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157
“scorn” and “disdain.” A verse sung to White at his retirement
party went: “He knows the First Amendment/He learned it up at
Yale/But when he writes opinions/Reporters go to jail.”158 When he
159
referred to “snoops” in California v. Greenwood, “many in the press
assumed that he was referring, with some feeling, to them.”160
White, who grew up poor in the beet fields of Wellington,
Colorado, had little contact with the press before he arrived in
161
Boulder to star on the gridiron for the Buffaloes. He arrived with
“no clippings,” none of the oft-sensationalized newspaper accounts
162
that followed star athletes of the day. Soon enough, his exploits on
the football field would earn him the nickname “Whizzer” White, “a
163
name he did not seek, did not like, and could not shake.” Despite
his aversion to publicity, “White was irresistible copy” as he became
the most famous scholar-athlete in America.164 Even as a Rhodes
Scholar at Oxford, White was “dogged constantly by tabloid
165
reporters.” After clerking and moving back to Denver in 1947, he
told a friend he had just three goals: “[T]o practice law, raise a family,
166
and keep my name out of the goddamn newspapers.”
Perhaps as a result of his experiences, Justice White was
“unwilling to accept” Black’s absolutist First Amendment position,
because, in his view, it meant that “the press remains completely
167
unaccountable for its actions.” And White’s pragmatism led him to
take “positions not clearly defined in terms of the alignments so
168
important to Justice Black.” Unlike Black, “White . . . was no fan of
press claims for broad First Amendment protection.”169 White’s view
of the press was a “far cry from the traditional Fourth Estate image of

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 5.
Perspectives on White: A Roundtable, 79 A.B.A. J. 68, 69 (1993).
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
HUTCHINSON, supra note 123, at 450.
Id. at 14–18.
Id. at 25.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Allan Ides, The Jurisprudence of Justice Byron White, 103 YALE L.J. 419, 440 (1993).
Carl Brent Swisher, History’s Panorama and Justice Black’s Career, in HUGO BLACK
AND THE SUPREME COURT: A SYMPOSIUM 37 (Stephen Parks Strickland ed., 1967).
169. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 71.
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170
the press,” and rather more akin to a traditional commercial
171
enterprise.
But it is perhaps possible to extrapolate too much from White’s
personal interactions with the press. “It is tempting to suppose . . .
that Justice White’s experiences with nosy reporters in his days as a
national sports celebrity left him hostile to the media. That view
probably overstates the case,” writes former White clerk John C. P.
172
Although “White felt used and demeaned—
Goldberg.
173
commodified—by the media,” he may not have been as hostile
toward the press as conventional wisdom suggests. It is probable that
no other Supreme Court Justice gave more interviews over a lifetime
than White. This started in his college years and continued through
his days as a Rhodes Scholar, as a professional football player and
Kennedy Justice Department official, and even after his retirement
from the Court. Although White “hated” reporters, he gave dozens, if
not hundreds, of interviews. As biographer Dennis Hutchinson
describes, White had “unvarnished frankness with the press.”174
In Branzburg, White pummeled claims of a constitutional
privilege for reporters. But he then went on to caution against
“[o]fficial harassment of the press” designed “to disrupt a reporter’s
relationship with his news sources.”175 “[N]ews gathering is not
without its First Amendment protections,” White noted, for “without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could
be eviscerated.”176 The Branzburg opinion “reaffirms White’s
consistency and evenhandness in cases involving the press.”177
Similarly, some of White’s later judicial decisions recognized the
importance of the Fourth Estate. Just two years after Branzburg, in

170.
171.

BOLLINGER, supra note 67, at 54.
Vincent A. Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 593 (“[White] characterized the press as a private-interest group rather
than an institution with a central function to perform in the constitutional system of checks and
balances.”).
172. John C.P. Goldberg, Judging Reputation: Realism and Common Law in Justice White’s
Defamation Jurisprudence, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1471, 1501 (2003).
173. Id. at 1508.
174. See HUTCHINSON, supra note 123, at 87. In his biography of White, Hutchinson cites
one hundred different newspapers, magazines, and television broadcasts, many of which contain
first-person interviews with the football player-scholar-Supreme Court Justice. Id. at 536–38.
175. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707–08 (1972).
176. Id. at 681, 707.
177. HUTCHINSON, supra note 123, at 361.
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178
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, White wrote eloquently of
179
the favored position of the press. “[T]he First Amendment erects a
virtually insurmountable barrier between government and the print
180
media,” White wrote. The Court, he said, “remain[s] intensely
skeptical about those measures that would allow government to
insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation’s press.”181
Although certainly no First Amendment absolutist, White did
recognize that the press had an important and favored role to play in
society.

III. BRANZBURG’S LEGACY
The Branzburg decision, rightly, was initially seen as a sound
rebuke to the press.182 But through wily lawyering, the press partially
managed to snatch a narrow victory from the jaws of defeat for a
while. Attorneys for media organizations nibbled around the edges of
Branzburg, with New York Times counsel James C. Goodale
commenting just three years later on the “developing qualified
privilege for newsmen.”183 By 2007, forty-nine states and the District
of Columbia had some form of protection for journalists by statute or
case law.184 Ironically, it is highly unlikely that the local prosecutor
who sought the testimony of reporter Branzburg in the early 1970s
would do so in similar circumstances since the passage of a “shield”
law in Kentucky.185
Yet the inroads achieved after Branzburg were short lived.
Federal authorities—specifically federal prosecutors emboldened by

178. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
179. Id. at 259–63 (White, J., concurring) (finding that newspapers have complete editorial
control of their publications on First Amendment grounds).
180. Id. at 259.
181. Id.
182. See Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First Amendment and Liability
for Trafficking in Speech, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1099, 1115 (2002) (noting “the apparently
resounding defeat in Branzburg for the press”).
183. Goodale, supra note 63, at 709.
184. Stone, supra note 18, at 42; Sean Hill & Elizabeth Soja, Reigniting the Debate, THE
NEWS MEDIA & LAW, Summer 2007, at 16, 17, available at http://www.rcfp.org/news/mag/313/con-reigniti.html. (“[A]ll the . . . states, except for one, recognize some form of a privilege for
journalists.”). The only state that has not recognized a privilege, either by statute or case law, is
Wyoming. Nestler, supra note 18, at 226.
185. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (LexisNexis 2006) (forbidding forced disclosure of
“the source of any information procured or obtained by [a journalist], and published in a
newspaper or by a radio or television broadcasting station”).
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recent decisions interpreting Branzburg—have led the charge against
reporters. Since 2005, “it is . . . de rigueur to round up the reporters,
haul them before a court, and threaten them with heavy fines and jail
sentences if they don’t cough up names and details concerning their
186
sources.” There is a particular minefield for reporters in the federalstate divide. Reporters covering a breaking story often pay little heed
to the potential jurisdictional turns a case may take down the line.
Often it is unclear whether a case will be prosecuted federally or on
the state level. In such instances, a reporter depending upon a state
privilege instead may be haled into federal court depending upon
jurisdictional questions wholly outside the scope of a reporter’s
inquiry.
Even in 1982, Floyd Abrams surmised that “[t]he area of
confidential sources remains the single one most likely to provoke
confrontation in the future.”187 Some twenty years later, Abrams said,
“a spate of leak investigations” shows “a purposeful decision made by
federal prosecutors . . . that the disclosure in one leak investigation
after another of who provided information to the press is more
important than the press’s ability to gather news and report it to the
public.”188 Federal prosecutors, emboldened in part by misguided
dicta by Judge Richard Posner, are wrongly interpreting Branzburg.
They fail to recognize the principle that a majority of circuits
established before Judge Posner entered the debate—that Branzburg
is a complicated decision that mandates some level of prosecutorial
and judicial discretion.
A. Posner’s Perplexity
Scholarly and popular authors have traced the reemergence of
pressing reporters to testify to dicta found in a 2003 opinion authored
by influential Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner.189 In McKevitt v.

186. Theodore B. Olson, Commentary, A Much-Needed Shield for Reporters, WASH. POST,
June 29, 2006, at A27.
187. Abrams, supra note 150, at 143.
188. ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 281.
189. For examples in law reviews, see Erik W. Laursen, Putting Journalists on Thin Ice:
McKevitt v. Pallasch, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 293, 294 (2004); Jaynie Randall, Freeing Newsgathering
from the Reporter’s Privilege, 114 YALE L.J. 1827, 1829–34 (2005); Leslie Siegel, Trampling on
the Fourth Estate, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 494–95 (2006); and West, supra note 61, at 1952 n.7. For
examples in the popular press, see Bates, supra note 64, and Jeffrey Toobin, Name That Source:
Why Are the Courts Leaning on Journalists?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 16, 2006, at 30, 34.
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190
Pallasch, Posner sought to flatten decisions in the majority of other
circuits finding at least a qualified reporter’s privilege.191 It may be no
coincidence that the leading prosecutorial efforts to compel reporters
192
to testify emerged from the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Chicago,
where Posner holds court.
Posner calls Powell’s concurrence in Branzburg a “notorious
193
example” of “casting the essential fifth vote for the ‘majority’
opinion while also writing a separate opinion qualifying the Court’s
194
opinion.” This, Posner says, is a “bad practice because it leaves the
reader uncertain whether the majority opinion or the concurring
opinion should be regarded as the best predictor of how the Court
195
would decide a similar case in the future.”
196
Judge Posner is known, celebrated, and reviled for his dicta. In
McKevitt, his penchant for professing opinions on matters not
essential to the case at hand led him to inveigh against courts that find
even a qualified privilege for reporters. “A large number of cases
conclude, rather surprisingly in light of Branzburg, that there is a
reporter’s privilege, though they do not agree on its scope,” a
perplexed Posner wrote.197 He then summarily disregarded cases
decided in seven other circuits as contrary to his own reading of
198
Posner went on to dismiss press concerns of
Branzburg.

190. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530 (7th Cir. 2003).
191. Id. at 534–35 (rejecting First Amendment protection for reporters against subpoenas in
a criminal defendant’s attempt to obtain nonconfidential records from biographers of a
government witness).
192. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Journalists Say Threat Of Subpoena Intensifies, N.Y. TIMES,
July 4, 2005, at C1.
193. Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 95 n.191 (2005).
194. Id. at 95.
195. Id.
196. E.g., Chi. Council of Lawyers, Evaluation of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 673, 799–800 (1994) (“Judge Posner’s opinions are notable
for the frequency with which they digress—in dicta of the most elaborate and extended sort—
from what appears to be the main point.”).
197. McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 532 (7th Cir. 2003).
198. Id. The seven cases in question rely upon a variety of legal analyses and policy
considerations in reaching at least a qualified privilege for journalists. See, e.g., In re Madden,
151 F.3d 125, 128–29 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[T]he privilege recognizes society’s interest in protecting
the integrity of the newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of information to the
public.”); United States v. Smith, 135 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 1998) (“[T]his privilege was
justified because the balance of interests favored the press in civil libel cases, unlike the grand
jury proceedings considered in Branzburg.”); Shoen v. Shoen, 5 F.3d 1289, 1292–93 (9th Cir.
1993) (“[T]he privilege recognizes society’s interest in protecting the integrity of the
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“harassment, burden, [and] using the press as an investigative arm of
199
Instead, Posner wrote, because “these
the government.”
considerations were rejected by Branzburg even in the context of a
200
confidential source, these courts may be skating on thin ice.”
Posner’s selective reading of Branzburg correctly noted that
201
Powell fully joined the majority opinion. But in casting aside the
considered opinions of seven other circuit courts, Posner failed to
appreciate that Branzburg is a complex decision that leaves room for
a potential reporter’s privilege. The holding of Branzburg explains
that there is no constitutional privilege for reporters to be found in
the First Amendment.202 Justice White’s majority opinion also states,
however, that prudential and evidentiary concerns drive part of this
203
finding. White amply shows his concern in these areas by his
admission that “we remain unclear how often and to what extent
informers are actually deterred from furnishing information when
newsmen are forced to testify before a grand jury.”204 Presumably, if
the deterrent effect became widespread, the press argument would be
strengthened.
B. Breaking News
The San Francisco Chronicle reporters at the center of the
swirling BALCO case are but two examples of a growing trend.
Federal prosecutors are increasingly willing to seek to compel

newsgathering process, and in ensuring the free flow of information to the public.”); United
States v. LaRouche Campaign, 841 F.2d 1176, 1181–82 (1st Cir. 1988) (showing concern for
“protection of confidential sources or information”); Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136,
142 (2d Cir. 1987) (“[The privilege] emanates from the strong public policy supporting the
unfettered communication of information by the journalist to the public.”); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 810 F.2d 580, 584–86 (6th Cir. 1987) (“[C]ourts should . . . make certain that the
proper balance is struck between freedom of the press and the obligation of all citizens to give
relevant testimony . . . .”); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986)
(“[I]nformation may only be compelled from a reporter claiming privilege if . . . it is highly
relevant, necessary to the proper presentation of the case, and unavailable from other
sources.”).
199. McKevitt, 339 F.3d at 533.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 531.
202. See EUGENE VOLOKH, THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND RELATED STATUTES 670 (2005).
203. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693–94 (1972) (commenting on the “[e]stimates of
the inhibiting effect of such subpoenas” and dismissing as “speculative” the injury the press
could suffer). The dissenting opinions, naturally, accepted the reporters’ claims of injury as
more concrete.
204. Id. at 693.
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reporters to give up their sources, using grand jury investigations to
205
wield subpoenas.
The incredibly politically charged case surrounding New York
Times reporter Judith Miller and the leaked disclosure of the identity
206
of CIA officer Valerie Plame is perhaps the highest profile example.
Many in the media abandoned Miller, feeling she had been a patsy for
the Bush administration in the run-up to the Iraq war and in the
resulting chaos.207 Whether this was legitimate criticism or not, Miller
ultimately spent eighty-five days in jail for refusing to disclose the
source of the leak—even though she had never written a story
identifying Plame.208 Judging Miller’s case,209 District of Columbia
Circuit Judge David B. Sentelle said that despite Justice Powell’s
concurrence and the decisions of other courts, the Supreme Court in
Branzburg broadly rejected any claims to a reporter’s privilege.210
“The Highest Court has spoken and never revisited the question,”
211
Sentelle wrote. “Without doubt, that is the end of the matter.”
Perhaps emboldened by this affirmation, the Justice Department
subpoenaed a “secret” document obtained by the American Civil
212
Liberties Union and the telephone records of New York Times
213
And in
reporters in an investigation into Islamic charities.

205. See, e.g., Editorial, Pentagon Papers Revisited; The Bush Administration’s EverExpanding War on the First Amendment, WASH. POST, Dec. 15, 2006, at A34 (“[N]ot since the
Nixon administration has the government so aggressively sought to crack down—not just on
leakers, but on reporters and others who obtain leaked material.”).
206. E.g., Robert Scheer, Commentary, Embedded over Her Head in Washington, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 23, 2005, at B13.
207. E.g., Maureen Dowd, Commentary, Woman of Mass Destruction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
2005, at A17.
208. Marie Brenner, Lies and Consequences, VANITY FAIR, Apr. 2006, at 204.
209. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
210. Id. at 969 (finding no material factual difference between Judith Miller’s case and
Branzburg).
211. Id. at 970.
212. Robert Barnes, For ACLU, a Victory in Standoff with U.S., WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2006,
at A9. Barnes quotes ACLU officials as saying the document is “mildly embarrassing” to the
government but does not involve serious national security matters. Id. The document was an
information paper prepared by an Army judge advocate telling soldiers not to photograph
prisoners of war or detained enemy combatants. Id.
213. Adam Liptak, Court Clears Way for Prosecutor to Review Records in Times Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2006, at A20. There is a facile argument that if the information is available to
multiple reporters—who pay nothing for the information—it is probably available to the targets
of the investigation, who would potentially pay millions of their alleged secret funds. The two
Islamic charities under investigation by the FBI for their links to terror organizations had
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December 2006, the Army subpoenaed two journalists to testify in
214
the court-martial of an officer who refused to deploy to Iraq. The
issue also arose in a civil context, most notably in a suit by nuclear
scientist Wen Ho Lee, who alleged that government leaks to the
media violated his privacy.215
It is perplexing, given that press freedom originated in the
United States, that certain other countries provide more protection
216
for reporters than does the First Amendment under Branzburg. The
Supreme Court has considered changes in state law to reflect “an
217
emerging awareness” among the states on matters of liberty.
Furthermore, the Court has looked to decisions abroad to reinforce
218
Looking to state and
its understanding of American law.
international law as tools to interpret the possible First Amendment
protection of reporters’ sources seems warranted. When the Court
decided Branzburg in 1972, only seventeen states had established a
reporter’s privilege. By 2007, forty-nine states and many foreign
countries recognize varying forms of one.219 Perhaps these changes
merit a more press-friendly interpretation of Branzburg.
The BALCO case in particular gives reason to question the
necessity of certain reporter subpoenas. In that case, eventually, an
FBI investigation found the source of the leak was a defense
220
attorney. Federal authorities made this determination through
regular gumshoe investigation—having an informant secretly tape-

“millions of dollars in assets” seized. Neil MacFarquhar, Muslim Charity Sues Treasury Dept.
and Seeks Dismissal of Charges of Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, at A24.
214. Bob Egelko, Army Subpoenas Journalists over Officer’s Quotes, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 18,
2006, at B1.
215. Paul Farhi, U.S., Media Settle with Wen Ho Lee, WASH. POST, June 3, 2006, at A1.
216. See ABRAMS, supra note 23, at 280. Abrams notes that the European Court of Human
Rights has found a reporter’s privilege. Similarly, in Germany, France, and Austria, among
other nations, the government may never force reporters to identify confidential sources.
Exceptions are “few and narrow” in Canada, Japan, and New Zealand. In Sweden, “it is a
breach of law for journalists to reveal their sources.” Id.
217. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (finding that state laws decriminalizing
sodomy reflect “an emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons
in deciding how to conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex”). But see id. at 598
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “[c]onstitutional entitlements do not spring into existence
because some States choose to lessen or eliminate criminal sanctions on certain behavior”).
218. See id. at 573 (majority opinion) (citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(ser. A) (1981) (a decision by the European Court of Human Rights)).
219. See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
220. Josh Peter, BALCO Leaks Exposed, YAHOO! SPORTS, Dec. 21, 2006, http://sports.
yahoo.com/top/news?slug=jo-balco122106&prov=yhoo&type=lgns.
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221
record conversations with the attorney. This showed the reporters’
testimony was never essential to the case, despite prosecutors’
protestations to the contrary.
Even Justice Department insiders have questioned the wisdom
and propriety of such prosecutorial actions,222 and their necessity is
dubious. Justice Department officials themselves selectively leaked
223
Former Solicitor General
information in the BALCO case.
Theodore B. Olson said, “[T]here is utterly no value in the current
224
state of confusion.” Placing reporters under constant threat of
subpoena for using confidential sources could amount to an
impermissible, indirect prior restraint.225

C. An Appeal for Discretion
Prosecutors and judges relying on Posner’s dicta appear to have
overstepped the Court’s allowance in Branzburg by wielding and
upholding subpoenas of dubious necessity. From a policy perspective
as well, the effort to seek out the testimony of reporters is
questionable.
The Court in Branzburg rejected an effort to create a
constitutional reporter’s privilege or to require a compelling
governmental interest to seek reporters’ testimony and make such
subpoenas a last resort in the interest of justice. But if it is not a last
resort, why is it not a first resort? That is, what is to stop prosecutors
from regularly putting reporters on the stand? Why should they
temper their zeal in seeking reporters’ testimony? Journalists can
always name their source. They are the only ones, aside from the

221. Associated Press, Report: Lawyer Cited as Source of Leak in BALCO Case, ESPN
NEWS, Dec. 21, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/news/story?id=2705452.
222. Joe Garofoli, 2 Chronicle Reporters at Center of Media, Government Standoff, S.F.
CHRON., Sept. 20, 2006, at A1 (quoting Mark Corallo, press secretary for former Attorney
General John Ashcroft, as saying neither he nor Ashcroft would have approved of subpoenaing
the BALCO reporters because “[i]n this case, there is no danger to life or issue of grave national
security”).
223. See Associated Press, Graham to be Charged with Obstructing BALCO Probe, ESPN
NEWS, Nov. 2, 2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/trackandfield/news/story?id=2646248 (citing
Justice Department officials “speaking on condition of anonymity . . . because the charges had
not been made public”).
224. Olson, supra note 186 (“[T]he rules regarding what reporters must disclose, and under
what circumstances, remain a hopelessly muddled mess.”).
225. See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989) (broadly condemning prior restraints on
publication absent “a state interest of the highest order” (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co.,
443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979))).
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direct source, who know the identity of the leaker. Why should any
prosecutor exhaust other avenues? Certainly the press can fight back
on the airwaves or on the news pages, because they buy ink by the
gallon. Yet in this era of demonization, when surveys rank reporters
226
alongside lawyers at the lower end of trustworthy professions, a
prosecutor might be seen as heroic for going after the press.
Considering the political launching pad that a U.S. Attorney position
can be,227 the publicity—good or bad—is priceless. But political gain is
no reason to convene a grand jury.
Many reporters routinely destroy tape recordings and notes of
interviews, until the point they are served with subpoenas.228 E-mail
exchanges and anything stored to a company computer or server,
however, may be retrieved if a subpoena is not quashed. E-mails
between Fainaru-Wada and BALCO founder Victor Conte were
cited extensively in court documents seeking to compel the reporters’
testimony.229
The answer, in the absence of a federal shield law or a
constitutional privilege, is discretion. Only a thin layer of judicial and
prosecutorial discretion, bolstered by consistent and probing press
coverage, prevents the press from becoming an investigative arm of
the government. Although he found no privilege for the reporters in
the Judith Miller case, District of Columbia Circuit Judge David S.
Tatel applied case law and common law to suggest exactly this kind of
discretion:
In leak cases, then, courts applying the privilege must consider not
only the government’s need for the information and exhaustion of

226. See The Harris Poll No. 61 at tbl.1 (Aug. 8, 2006), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/
harris_poll/index.asp?PID=688) (finding that journalists rank below athletes and just above
members of Congress, while lawyers rank only above actors in public perception of
trustworthiness).
227. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, For Federal Prosecutors, Politics is Ever-Present, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 2007, § 4 (Week in Review) at 3 (“[U.S. Attorneys] are political appointees who serve
at the pleasure of the president, and they often use their jobs as political steppingstones.”).
228. Cf. Jack Shafer, Advice for Paranoid Reporters, SLATE, Apr. 25, 2006, http://
www.slate.com/id/2140499/ (last visited Sept. 27, 2007) (advising reporters to destroy their notes
after publication). See generally The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, The First
Amendment Handbook: Confidential Sources and Information: What to Do When You Are
Subpoenaed, http://www.rcfp.org/handbook/c04p05.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2007) (advising
reporters to “[n]ever destroy notes, tapes, drafts or other documents once . . . served with [a]
subpoena”).
229. Lance Pugmire, Conte Is Linked to Stories Using Grand Jury Leaks, L.A. TIMES, June
23, 2006, at D3.
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alternative sources, but also the two competing public interests lying
at the heart of the balancing test. Specifically, the court must weigh
the public interest in compelling disclosure, measured by the harm
the leak caused, against the public interest in newsgathering,
230
measured by the leaked information's value.

Discretion, however, is more than a suggestion. It is a Supreme Court
231
mandate after Branzburg. With due regard to Judge Posner, whose
dicta can set off new legal strategies and influence other judges to
acquiesce to his wisdom, there is some protection offered reporters by
the Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
Taken together, the Branzburg opinions—both published and
unpublished—argue strongly for the careful exercise of discretion by
prosecutors and judges in evaluating whether to seek to compel a
reporter to testify. As the Supreme Court shifted from Black to White
on press protection in the early 1970s, it nevertheless remained
convinced that some press protection must exist. This was shown not
only by Branzburg itself but also by White’s opinion in Tornillo.232
233
The “relative ordinariness of the case” involving the BALCO
leak belies the intense effort put forth by prosecutors to investigate it.
As it became clearer that prosecutors were having difficulty pursuing
234
the high-profile athletes they initially targeted, their attention
turned to plugging leaks in their own case. There is extreme danger in
an unchecked federal prosecutorial power to subpoena reporters and
target the messengers rather than any real culprits.

230. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1175 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (Tatel,
J., concurring).
231. See supra Part I.
232. Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259 (1974) (White, J., concurring)
(“Regardless of how beneficent-sounding the purposes of controlling the press might be, we
prefer ‘the power of reason as applied through public discussion’ and remain intensely skeptical
about those measures that would allow government to insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of
this Nation’s press.”).
233. Liptak, supra note 5.
234. Popular opinion, although generally condemning steroid use among athletes, also
reflected a growing concern about a prosecutorial witch hunt. Comedian Chris Rock joked on
The Late Show with David Letterman that “[t]he government is not trying to get [Osama] bin
Laden. They’re trying to get Barry Bonds.” Mike Penner, Morning Briefing, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
14, 2007, at D2.
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The previously unpublished private notes of the Supreme Court
Justices and Chief Justice Burger’s draft opinion show strong
prudential and historical sensitivity when they decided Branzburg.
Although skeptical of any constitutional or common law claims by the
reporters, the majority issued their decision assuming a base level of
judicial and prosecutorial discretion. But if history is any indication, a
new case before the Court—or a debate before Congress on a federal
shield law235—would yield numerous examples of the breakdown in
prosecutorial and judicial discretion. In such a case, the Court should
mandate the discretion it relied upon in reaching its decision in
Branzburg and recognize at least a qualified privilege for reporters.

235. Shield laws for reporters have been introduced repeatedly, but never passed, in both
the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate. E.g., Walter Pincus, Senate Panel Freezes Bill on
Legal Protection for Reporters, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 2006, at A13.

